In the article we read, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy points out that the idea that egalitarianism is based on envy requires that people who are well off could not be egalitarians, since they would have little to envy. It seems possible, however, that wealthy people could in fact be egalitarians, having a desire for everyone to be able to enjoy prosperity. Considering this possibility, it seems much more viable to consider something else as the basis for egalitarianism, such as compassion, or a sense of joy in seeing one's whole society prosper. An egalitarianism based on grounds such as these could then focus on raising the general standard of living, rather than limiting it for the sake of equality. This seems consistent with Marx's definition of wealth, if I remember it correctly, as the creation of the greatest number of needs that a society can fulfill. (I hope I am not contributing to an extensive tradition of misquoting Marx.)

Does the motivation to prosper necessitate a sense of envy in regard to an ideal, or can another emotion provide such motivation?

I often find myself feeling ambivalent as to whether it is better to pursue desires and aspirations, or to disengage from them, and find contentment through some Buddhist-like practice of disengagement. Earlier in my life, I was firmly convinced that something like Nirvana was actually attainable. Later, I began to question if I would want it even if I could attain it. At one point, I remember reading in the Bhagavad Gita a passage that suggested that one should remain detached from worldly desires, but still engage with in integrity in worldly affairs. This advice seems to be possibly helpful, since, in order not to be miserable, it seems necessary for one to be able to have at least some degree of detached perspective on the projects and desires that one pursues, and to be able to reassess them whenever certain conditions change.

These two approaches may also be considered in terms of two major Western philosophies: those of Rene Girard and Nietzsche. Girard says that Jesus Christ provides a model for disengaging from a cycle of mimetic violence on which culture is based. Nietzsche, on the other hand, describes Christianity as being based on a slave morality, according to which those who are weak seek, out of weariness, to end pursuits of power that propel culture to new levels. He says that, rather than follow this morality, people should strive for the ideal of the "Ubermensch." I often feel torn between these two approaches to desire, power, and culture. I also often associate Girard's position with a hermeneutics of disbelief, and Nietzsche's with a hermeneutics of belief. In order to operate in society, many would claim that it is necessary to believe in something. Why for instance, does one eat, unless one believes that one should? At the same time, a hermeneutics of disbelief seems necessary to differentiate between what is worth believing in, and what is not. Considering belief as a purely practical matter, I often question whether the details of one's system of beliefs even matter, as long as that belief system allows one to operate in a favorable way. This, of course, leads to the question of whether there can be a more or less objective standard of favorability. Such a standard might, presumably, emerge from a sense of mutual interests among different people.

It is also worth noting that an effort to attain Nirvana, or to disengage from cultural mimetic violence, requires a belief that such an option is both possible and desireable, which seems at least superficially contradictory, especially in the case of wanting to not want. While I do think that lack of desire and lack of belief are possible, such a lack can only matter from the perspective of a presence of desire or belief. In other words, a lack of desire or belief can only have value as determined by desire or belief. I suppose it remains to be determined whether such lack can indeed be valuable. Perhaps, in the case of an individual, a reduction of desire or belief can at times provide relief, while a deficiency thereof can often provoke distress, depending perhaps on how one experiences such a deficiency.

While a lack of desire or belief can be evaluated given a presence thereof, it seems impossible to evaluate a presence of desire or belief from a lack thereof. Are desires and beliefs self-justificatory, or can evaluation in terms of different desires and beliefs constitute external evaluation? In order to perform such an evaluation, it seems that one must engage in both a hermeneutics of disbelief to the extent that one can step back from one's own belief system, and a hermeneutics of belief to the extent that one can engage with values at all. It seems inevitable, however, that one must eventually arrive at some predominant value that unifies all of one's other values. Many would call such a value a "god term." Can one justify such a god term? Does a god term require justification? Is it possible to measure the pros and cons of a lack and a presence of values?

In defense of meat | The Argument

In defense of meat The Argument

This site contains an argument by Kevin Slaten against the claim that a switch to vegetarian diets is necessary for us to save the planet from global warming, and also beneficial for our health. In regard to the problem of climate change, he argues, first of all, that the beef industry, rather than the entire meat indusrty, creates the most dangerous quantity of emisions. Methane capture and storage technologies apparently offer a solution to this problem. Also, Slaten discusses the prospect of in vitro meat, which is meat tissue grown by scientists in labs (eww). Slaten also discusses health issues, and says that certain meats, such as fish, contain nutirents that the human body needs and cannot get from anywhere else, and also that, beef notwithstanding, other meats "pose little risk to human health." I do not know very much about many of these issues, and will have to look into them further. The argument, however, does fail to mention any of the moral issues that we talked about in class, although one may use the fact of the important nutrient in fish to formulate a morality related argument. However, if we find a way to synthetically create this nutirent, do we have a moral obligation to obtain it in this way rather than by eating fish?