I would like to explore two scientific theories that are often said to support radical constructivism. The first is the Schroedinger's cat theory. I don't know the details of this theory, but it argues that at any given moment, two contradictory realities may exist at the same time, such that the same cat may be at once dead and alive. I believe that the argument usually used to link this theory to RC is that objective reality is indeterminate, so that experience is supposed to take priority. This argument does not work, however, because, according to Schroedinger's theory, the cat is objectively both dead and alive, independent of anyone's experience. His theory therefore depends on some form of realism.

The second theory is the one that human expectations affect the metaphysical world, as evidenced by certain experiments with subatomic molecules. This theory also fails to support RC, for the very same reason. The theory once again assumes the existence of an objective world, this time in order that humans may affect it.

Is the principle of scientific fallibility consistent with the RC notion of viability?

Response to Ben Hollows

Supposing we do consider RC only in terms of epistemology and pedagogy, since it claims not to deal with ontology, it still needs to be analyzed in order to determine if its epistemology and pedagogy are worth applying. We might consider it, for example, in comparison with realist epistemology and pedagogy, which do involve ontology and ontological claims. Even though RC does not consider ontology, therefore, it might still be said that this refusal to consider it still constitutes an approach to it, an approach, moreover, that differs significantly from other approaches, and this approach to ontology, among many other things, needs to be considered when analyzing RC for its epistemological and pedagogical value. To put it more shortly, RC epistemology and pedagogy do involve an approach to ontology, even if they do not involve ontology itself.

What are the pedagogical implications of RC?

I have to wonder how seriously radical constructivists take their concept of viability.If science, which uses objectivity to make sense of reality, proves viable, then it seems to make sense to really believe in objectivity. Many radical constructivists, however, will only admit that objectivity seems viable. Does this epistemological move from semblance to actuality constitute a leap of faith?

In Barry's last post, he mentions the postmodern idea of different paradigms and a set of perspectives that constitute knowledge. Similarly, postmodern thinkers often speak about multiple truths. Very early in the semester, we talked in class about truth as function of the relationship between truth claims and something that they refer to, which seems to consist of objective reality. I think that it seems sensible to entertain the notion of multiple valid interpretations of a similar reality. This leads me also to consider the unity or multiplicity of objective reality itself. Is objective reality necessarily one unitary referent, or is it a multiplicity of references? Do both options constitute valid interpretations?

In Bridges to the World, I found very interesting Russel's distinction between fallibility and extreme skepticism. While the former questions the truth of individual claims or beliefs, the latter questions the truth of all claims or beliefs all at once. This extreme form of skepticism self-destructs, because it eliminates any measure of truth by which to determine its own veracity. Also very importantly, this situation makes clear that fallibility requires some measure of truth in order to determine falsehood. It is therefore very important, when operating with fallibility, to keep in mind that there does exist some truth to be recognized.
Is it possible to imagine a world that involves neither truth nor falsity?

I have often come across the theory that concepts that seem new at first are really just combinations of other more basic concepts. However, I'm considering right now the idea that concepts may behave in a way similar to physical reality in giving emergence to things that are substantially different from their component parts. Human consciousness, for example, is very different from the physical components from which it emerges. This leads me to ask if concepts can also interact in such a way as to give emergence to other concepts that are genuinely new. Furthermore, if new concepts are actually possible, then is it also possible to discover things in nature that suggest concepts that are vastly different from concepts that one is already familiar with?

In class, we discussed Ernst von Glasersfeld's agnostic position in regard to metaphysics. However, there are a number of instances in his Introduction to Radical Constructivism at which he seems to acknowledge an external reality, or his argument implies the existence of an external reality. First, he seems to refer favorably to Piaget's theory of evolutionary epistemology, which involves an external reality that eliminates ideas that do not "fit." Given this acknowledgment alone, von Glasersfeld's epistemology does involve an ontological affirmation of external reality. His argument might still assert substantial limits on one's access to such a reality. However, his inability to identify the extent of reality that one cannot know complicates this assertion.

Later, von Glasersfeld discusses the way in which a magician can trick an audience into constructing a particular idea of reality that is not true. This ability to recognize the falsehood of a construction indicates both that human experience does provide access to a certain degree of objectivity, and that objectivity operates to a certain degree in the realm of experience. Knowledge of such objectivity seems to me to undermine radical constructivism.

In regard to von Glasersfeld's alleged separation of epistemology and metaphysics, I cannot conceive of a metaphysical statement that does not invoke epistemology, but is it possible to make an epistemological claim without invoking metaphysics? Epistemology obviously involves an ontology in regard to what can be known, but must it claim anything about the existence of what cannot be known?

The existence of rocks and dinosaurs independent of human knowledge compels me to reconsider my concept of the world solely as an experience. The world as we know it, as a contingent circumstance, exists only as a result of a real past of which we lack considerable knowledge. It depends, therefore, on real unknowns, including a past that, by virtue of the exclusion of events that did not occur, exhibits precognitive distinction. Unknown rocks and other real and unknown objects indicate the existence of properties that fit our categories prior to the categorization of such properties. The world, therefore, seems to be real independent of knowledge or experience. We seem, furthermore, to have access, through experience and knowledge, to a reality that does not depend on access through experience and knowledge.

To what extent is it possible to know the extent to which our categories reflect properties that precede them?

Maturana's essay gives a very interesting presentist account of time. His assertion that life and experience is something that always takes place now resonates very strongly with my own experience. However, right after this description of time, he explains that everything we know is restrained to the system of our language, and we cannot really know anything outside of language. This seems to contradict his statement, or any statement, about the way that time operates objectively. Also, even though it seems to make sense intuitionally that things always happen now, it still seems to be the case that things have happened before also, and that things will happen in the future.

Does human experience itself offer contradictory intuitions about time?

Is it possible for time to "flow" without a container? When I think of flow, I think of something flowing through or past something else, such as a river flowing through some kind of landscape. In this example, the landscape would seem to be the container, while the river is the thing that flows. However, I can also imagine flow to occur in relationship to a past state of affairs, so that time may be measured in terms of the relationship between the present and the past. This concept of time most closely resembles the idea that time is change in and of itself, without any sort of container. However, does the past in this model constitute a sort of container, insofar as it is a point of reference? This concept of time seems supportive of the growing past theory of time, since it utilizes the past to make sense of the present. I cannot think how time could be considered in terms of flow from a presentist point of view, due to the lack of reference or container.

In the first analogy, involving the river flowing through a landscape, would time be represented by the container, or the thing that flows, or the relationship between the two?

The block theory of time, presentism, and the growing past theory pose very different explanations for the way time behaves. The block theory considers the past present, and future as collapsed into a fully determined whole. Presentism considers only the present to be objectively real, with the past having ceased to exist, and the future yet to be determined. The growing past theory considers the past to be real, with the moving present adding to the past, and the future yet undetermined. The past may be considered real to the extent that it contributes to an explanation of the present. Since the block theory considers the future as already determined, it poses a logical problem for free will and its associated morality. The presentist and growing past theories, however, consider the future to be undetermined, and therefore allow for free will.

Lacking sufficient evidence for one of these theories over another, it is interesting to consider the moral incentives for each image of time that the theories offer. The multiplicity of possible models also provides a certain image in regard to time, which also suggests moral implications.

Should either moral preferences or hard evidence, including a lack thereof, have precedence over the other in influencing a working conception of time?

In the article we read, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy points out that the idea that egalitarianism is based on envy requires that people who are well off could not be egalitarians, since they would have little to envy. It seems possible, however, that wealthy people could in fact be egalitarians, having a desire for everyone to be able to enjoy prosperity. Considering this possibility, it seems much more viable to consider something else as the basis for egalitarianism, such as compassion, or a sense of joy in seeing one's whole society prosper. An egalitarianism based on grounds such as these could then focus on raising the general standard of living, rather than limiting it for the sake of equality. This seems consistent with Marx's definition of wealth, if I remember it correctly, as the creation of the greatest number of needs that a society can fulfill. (I hope I am not contributing to an extensive tradition of misquoting Marx.)

Does the motivation to prosper necessitate a sense of envy in regard to an ideal, or can another emotion provide such motivation?

I often find myself feeling ambivalent as to whether it is better to pursue desires and aspirations, or to disengage from them, and find contentment through some Buddhist-like practice of disengagement. Earlier in my life, I was firmly convinced that something like Nirvana was actually attainable. Later, I began to question if I would want it even if I could attain it. At one point, I remember reading in the Bhagavad Gita a passage that suggested that one should remain detached from worldly desires, but still engage with in integrity in worldly affairs. This advice seems to be possibly helpful, since, in order not to be miserable, it seems necessary for one to be able to have at least some degree of detached perspective on the projects and desires that one pursues, and to be able to reassess them whenever certain conditions change.

These two approaches may also be considered in terms of two major Western philosophies: those of Rene Girard and Nietzsche. Girard says that Jesus Christ provides a model for disengaging from a cycle of mimetic violence on which culture is based. Nietzsche, on the other hand, describes Christianity as being based on a slave morality, according to which those who are weak seek, out of weariness, to end pursuits of power that propel culture to new levels. He says that, rather than follow this morality, people should strive for the ideal of the "Ubermensch." I often feel torn between these two approaches to desire, power, and culture. I also often associate Girard's position with a hermeneutics of disbelief, and Nietzsche's with a hermeneutics of belief. In order to operate in society, many would claim that it is necessary to believe in something. Why for instance, does one eat, unless one believes that one should? At the same time, a hermeneutics of disbelief seems necessary to differentiate between what is worth believing in, and what is not. Considering belief as a purely practical matter, I often question whether the details of one's system of beliefs even matter, as long as that belief system allows one to operate in a favorable way. This, of course, leads to the question of whether there can be a more or less objective standard of favorability. Such a standard might, presumably, emerge from a sense of mutual interests among different people.

It is also worth noting that an effort to attain Nirvana, or to disengage from cultural mimetic violence, requires a belief that such an option is both possible and desireable, which seems at least superficially contradictory, especially in the case of wanting to not want. While I do think that lack of desire and lack of belief are possible, such a lack can only matter from the perspective of a presence of desire or belief. In other words, a lack of desire or belief can only have value as determined by desire or belief. I suppose it remains to be determined whether such lack can indeed be valuable. Perhaps, in the case of an individual, a reduction of desire or belief can at times provide relief, while a deficiency thereof can often provoke distress, depending perhaps on how one experiences such a deficiency.

While a lack of desire or belief can be evaluated given a presence thereof, it seems impossible to evaluate a presence of desire or belief from a lack thereof. Are desires and beliefs self-justificatory, or can evaluation in terms of different desires and beliefs constitute external evaluation? In order to perform such an evaluation, it seems that one must engage in both a hermeneutics of disbelief to the extent that one can step back from one's own belief system, and a hermeneutics of belief to the extent that one can engage with values at all. It seems inevitable, however, that one must eventually arrive at some predominant value that unifies all of one's other values. Many would call such a value a "god term." Can one justify such a god term? Does a god term require justification? Is it possible to measure the pros and cons of a lack and a presence of values?

In defense of meat | The Argument

In defense of meat The Argument

This site contains an argument by Kevin Slaten against the claim that a switch to vegetarian diets is necessary for us to save the planet from global warming, and also beneficial for our health. In regard to the problem of climate change, he argues, first of all, that the beef industry, rather than the entire meat indusrty, creates the most dangerous quantity of emisions. Methane capture and storage technologies apparently offer a solution to this problem. Also, Slaten discusses the prospect of in vitro meat, which is meat tissue grown by scientists in labs (eww). Slaten also discusses health issues, and says that certain meats, such as fish, contain nutirents that the human body needs and cannot get from anywhere else, and also that, beef notwithstanding, other meats "pose little risk to human health." I do not know very much about many of these issues, and will have to look into them further. The argument, however, does fail to mention any of the moral issues that we talked about in class, although one may use the fact of the important nutrient in fish to formulate a morality related argument. However, if we find a way to synthetically create this nutirent, do we have a moral obligation to obtain it in this way rather than by eating fish?

It seems to me that our country is largely founded on a consequestialist sense of patriotism. I say this because in its conception, it was created as an agreement between states to cooperate with each other for the mutual benefit of everyone involved. It therefore involves an agreement between citizens to practice loyalty for beneficial consequences. This reminds me of John Rawls' idea of political constructivism, according to which citizens agree to certain political principles that they arrive at through the practice of free rationality, on the grounds that such principles seem to embody reasonable terms of cooperation. In addition to this, people who are born in the United States often develop a more deontological sense of patriotism, whereby they feel an attatchment and sense of favor for there country on less practical, though perhaps equally arbitrary grounds, such as a more emotional favor for the place where they were born, and the people and culture with which they have grown up. This latter form of patriotism obviously involves a greater sense of passion than the former, and there is good reason to think that people should feel passionate about the place where they live, partly because the capacity for emotional integrity makes possible an understanding of it, which is essential for humanitarianism. However, does this latter form of patriotism, lacking rational principles, involve a greater danger of slipping into imperialist nationalism?

I thought of an example that seems relevant both to our discussion of aesthetics and to our discussion about ideological tolerance. If I say that I like only chocolate chip cookies, this does not mean that I think that all cookies should be chocolate chip. One may extend this example to say that not everyone has to follow one's own way 0f thinking. However, is the claim that not everything must be the way I like it or want it to be or think it should be an ideological claim (which finds fault with other ideologies that do not include tolerance)? Also, in the political/ideological realm, is tolerance in part a recognition of one's own fallibilism? If so, should one continue to practice tolerance, or try to correct one's own fallibility, or both?

I want to pose again a question that I offered in our last class, to which a few people responded, just to see if anyone else has any thoughts. Does either found reality or constructed reality deserve more attention than the other? This is an axiological question, concerning what elements of reality are to be considered valuable. It is at least apparent that found reality lacks significance independent of our axiological goals, and that axiology can be either informed by or significantly idiosyncratic of found reality, or both. I would conjecture that, at the very least, we need to pay enough attention to found reality to know the best ways to pursue our axiological projects successfully. Does anyone else have any thoughts about this?