In Barry's last post, he mentions the postmodern idea of different paradigms and a set of perspectives that constitute knowledge. Similarly, postmodern thinkers often speak about multiple truths. Very early in the semester, we talked in class about truth as function of the relationship between truth claims and something that they refer to, which seems to consist of objective reality. I think that it seems sensible to entertain the notion of multiple valid interpretations of a similar reality. This leads me also to consider the unity or multiplicity of objective reality itself. Is objective reality necessarily one unitary referent, or is it a multiplicity of references? Do both options constitute valid interpretations?

In Bridges to the World, I found very interesting Russel's distinction between fallibility and extreme skepticism. While the former questions the truth of individual claims or beliefs, the latter questions the truth of all claims or beliefs all at once. This extreme form of skepticism self-destructs, because it eliminates any measure of truth by which to determine its own veracity. Also very importantly, this situation makes clear that fallibility requires some measure of truth in order to determine falsehood. It is therefore very important, when operating with fallibility, to keep in mind that there does exist some truth to be recognized.
Is it possible to imagine a world that involves neither truth nor falsity?

I have often come across the theory that concepts that seem new at first are really just combinations of other more basic concepts. However, I'm considering right now the idea that concepts may behave in a way similar to physical reality in giving emergence to things that are substantially different from their component parts. Human consciousness, for example, is very different from the physical components from which it emerges. This leads me to ask if concepts can also interact in such a way as to give emergence to other concepts that are genuinely new. Furthermore, if new concepts are actually possible, then is it also possible to discover things in nature that suggest concepts that are vastly different from concepts that one is already familiar with?

In class, we discussed Ernst von Glasersfeld's agnostic position in regard to metaphysics. However, there are a number of instances in his Introduction to Radical Constructivism at which he seems to acknowledge an external reality, or his argument implies the existence of an external reality. First, he seems to refer favorably to Piaget's theory of evolutionary epistemology, which involves an external reality that eliminates ideas that do not "fit." Given this acknowledgment alone, von Glasersfeld's epistemology does involve an ontological affirmation of external reality. His argument might still assert substantial limits on one's access to such a reality. However, his inability to identify the extent of reality that one cannot know complicates this assertion.

Later, von Glasersfeld discusses the way in which a magician can trick an audience into constructing a particular idea of reality that is not true. This ability to recognize the falsehood of a construction indicates both that human experience does provide access to a certain degree of objectivity, and that objectivity operates to a certain degree in the realm of experience. Knowledge of such objectivity seems to me to undermine radical constructivism.

In regard to von Glasersfeld's alleged separation of epistemology and metaphysics, I cannot conceive of a metaphysical statement that does not invoke epistemology, but is it possible to make an epistemological claim without invoking metaphysics? Epistemology obviously involves an ontology in regard to what can be known, but must it claim anything about the existence of what cannot be known?

The existence of rocks and dinosaurs independent of human knowledge compels me to reconsider my concept of the world solely as an experience. The world as we know it, as a contingent circumstance, exists only as a result of a real past of which we lack considerable knowledge. It depends, therefore, on real unknowns, including a past that, by virtue of the exclusion of events that did not occur, exhibits precognitive distinction. Unknown rocks and other real and unknown objects indicate the existence of properties that fit our categories prior to the categorization of such properties. The world, therefore, seems to be real independent of knowledge or experience. We seem, furthermore, to have access, through experience and knowledge, to a reality that does not depend on access through experience and knowledge.

To what extent is it possible to know the extent to which our categories reflect properties that precede them?

Maturana's essay gives a very interesting presentist account of time. His assertion that life and experience is something that always takes place now resonates very strongly with my own experience. However, right after this description of time, he explains that everything we know is restrained to the system of our language, and we cannot really know anything outside of language. This seems to contradict his statement, or any statement, about the way that time operates objectively. Also, even though it seems to make sense intuitionally that things always happen now, it still seems to be the case that things have happened before also, and that things will happen in the future.

Does human experience itself offer contradictory intuitions about time?

Is it possible for time to "flow" without a container? When I think of flow, I think of something flowing through or past something else, such as a river flowing through some kind of landscape. In this example, the landscape would seem to be the container, while the river is the thing that flows. However, I can also imagine flow to occur in relationship to a past state of affairs, so that time may be measured in terms of the relationship between the present and the past. This concept of time most closely resembles the idea that time is change in and of itself, without any sort of container. However, does the past in this model constitute a sort of container, insofar as it is a point of reference? This concept of time seems supportive of the growing past theory of time, since it utilizes the past to make sense of the present. I cannot think how time could be considered in terms of flow from a presentist point of view, due to the lack of reference or container.

In the first analogy, involving the river flowing through a landscape, would time be represented by the container, or the thing that flows, or the relationship between the two?

The block theory of time, presentism, and the growing past theory pose very different explanations for the way time behaves. The block theory considers the past present, and future as collapsed into a fully determined whole. Presentism considers only the present to be objectively real, with the past having ceased to exist, and the future yet to be determined. The growing past theory considers the past to be real, with the moving present adding to the past, and the future yet undetermined. The past may be considered real to the extent that it contributes to an explanation of the present. Since the block theory considers the future as already determined, it poses a logical problem for free will and its associated morality. The presentist and growing past theories, however, consider the future to be undetermined, and therefore allow for free will.

Lacking sufficient evidence for one of these theories over another, it is interesting to consider the moral incentives for each image of time that the theories offer. The multiplicity of possible models also provides a certain image in regard to time, which also suggests moral implications.

Should either moral preferences or hard evidence, including a lack thereof, have precedence over the other in influencing a working conception of time?