The block theory of time, presentism, and the growing past theory pose very different explanations for the way time behaves. The block theory considers the past present, and future as collapsed into a fully determined whole. Presentism considers only the present to be objectively real, with the past having ceased to exist, and the future yet to be determined. The growing past theory considers the past to be real, with the moving present adding to the past, and the future yet undetermined. The past may be considered real to the extent that it contributes to an explanation of the present. Since the block theory considers the future as already determined, it poses a logical problem for free will and its associated morality. The presentist and growing past theories, however, consider the future to be undetermined, and therefore allow for free will.

Lacking sufficient evidence for one of these theories over another, it is interesting to consider the moral incentives for each image of time that the theories offer. The multiplicity of possible models also provides a certain image in regard to time, which also suggests moral implications.

Should either moral preferences or hard evidence, including a lack thereof, have precedence over the other in influencing a working conception of time?